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Executive Summary 
 
Introduction 
 This report examines the issue of legislative involvement in performance-
based budgeting reforms – specifically, whether and how legislative bodies should be 
engaged in implementation of the reform.  Traditionally, budgeting and management 
reforms have focused on the executive branch and administrative agencies.  However, 
a review of the history of budget reforms suggests that such an approach may be 
problematic.  When legislatures are not engaged in the reform, they may fail to use 
the information generated or worse, may actively resist implementation.  The analysis 
presented in this paper assesses current state-level implementation of performance-
based management and budgeting reforms and how legislative involvement affects 
implementation.  The analysis also assesses whether increasing legislative 
professionalism might improve the level of implementation.   
 
Key Findings 
● Legislative oversight but not legislative professionalism play an 
important role in the implementation of performance-based 
management and budgeting reforms. 
 
Drawing on a national survey of agency staff and budget officers in the states, 
the analysis presented in this report shows that the identification of legislative 
oversight of a performance management reform is one of the most consistent 
predictors of effective implementation across the government, including in agency 
management decisions, in budgetary processes, as well as in legislative policy-
making.  Although not a focus of this report, gubernatorial leadership also is an 
important variable, suggesting that elected official leadership in both branches is 
important if agencies are going to take the reform seriously.   
 A further question in the literature on legislatures is whether professional 
legislatures – full-time, highly resourced legislative bodies – provide more effective 
policymaking and oversight.  Although legislative professionalism may be important 
for improving other legislative activities, this research finds little evidence that 
professionalism or higher levels of staff resources are the key to improving 
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implementation of performance-based management and budgeting reforms.  In fact, 
term limits appear to have a positive influence on implementation of the reform, and 
other measures of legislative professionalism have a statistically significant negative 
influence on implementation.   
The positive effect of legislative oversight and the negative effect of 
professionalism suggests that the quality of legislator and staff engagement rather that 
quantity may be a deciding factor.  A further examination of states where legislative 
bodies play a significant role in oversight shows that high levels of legislative 
responsibility are not necessarily coupled with high levels of professionalism. States 
such as Virginia, Texas, New Mexico, and South Carolina, all have citizen 
legislatures or “moderately” professional legislatures, but at the same time have 
legislatures with substantial responsibility for budgeting, policymaking, and 
oversight.  
● Legislators are more likely to trust performance information from 
their own staff or other legislatively-affiliated organizations, rather 
than agencies, executive staff, or interest groups. 
 
 In a second section, this report describes the results of a 2005 survey of 
members of the Georgia House and Senate Appropriations Committees.  The results 
of this survey indicate that legislators would welcome access to more results and 
performance-based information.  However, an important criterion may be the source 
of this information. Although survey respondents came from both parties, legislators 
tended to be generally distrustful of agency self-reporting and even executive staff 
analyses of agency performance.  Instead, legislators favored analyses from 
legislatively affiliated sources such as legislative staff and the Department of Audits.   
A final section of the report simply describes what “legislative oversight” 
might look like by examining how the legislatures in Florida, Texas, and New 
Mexico are involved in the state’s performance-based budgeting and management 
reform.  A key feature in each of these states is an investment in legislative capacity 
to effectively evaluate performance information.   
Legislative Influences on Performance-Based  
Budgeting Reform  
 
 
 1
I. Legislative Use of Performance Information 
Introduction 
 In 1993, the Georgia legislature passed the Budget Accountability and 
Planning Act.  This legislation required “an outcome based budgeting system that 
relates funding to achievement” of agency goals and objectives and “measures 
agency performance against the attainment of planned outcomes.” (Georgia State 
Senate 1993, SB 335.) Georgia was not alone in the passage of this kind of 
legislation.  Over the past fifteen years, 47 out of 50 states have attempted to integrate 
performance information into their budgeting processes, and 33 have passed 
legislation to this effect (Melkers and Willoughby 2004).  Similarly, Georgia is not 
alone in struggling to implement this reform.  Numerous studies have shown that 
although performance management practices are increasingly prevalent, performance 
reforms are less likely to be integrated into budgetary processes generally and 
legislative budgetary processes in particular (Joyce 1999; Melkers and Willoughby 
2004).   
 This report looks at the efforts to implement performance-based budgeting 
reforms across the states using both quantitative and qualitative analysis and assesses 
the institutional characteristics and legislative role in those states where the reform 
appears to have been successfully implemented.  The analysis indicates that 
legislative engagement is a critical component of implementation and should not be 
ignored or pushed to the side.  Legislatures with more engagement in oversight of the 
reform are associated with more effective administrative implementation of the 
reform – particularly in budgeting processes.  While some have suggested that 
legislative capacity to implement performance-based reforms is a function of their 
level of their professionalism, this research also suggests that legislative 
professionalism may not be the answer and may even have a negative effect on 
administrative outcomes.  A survey of members of the Georgia State appropriations 
committee members indicates that state legislators are interested in having more 
results-based information presented to them and are more likely to rely on 
performance information from sources not perceived as having a conflict of interest – 
i.e., sources external from the agencies or executive branch.   
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What is Performance-Based Budgeting (PBB)1? 
 Although PBB comes in many forms and goes by many different names, key 
characteristics are a focus on outcomes or results rather than inputs or outputs and an 
effort to shift budgetary orientation from purchasing inputs to “purchasing results” 
(Joyce 1999).  Philosophically, advocates of PBB tend to press for more 
entrepreneurial government, arguing that government orientation should be shifted 
from control over inputs to a more “contractual focus,” where agency leadership and 
elected officials give managers increased freedom from rigid administrative controls 
but are expected to produce performance results in return (Osborne and Gaebler 
1992; Cothran 1993).   
 In a budgeting system, this typically means reduced use of object classes to 
control spending on inputs and increased focus on the definition of programs, 
programmatic outcomes, and the associated resources required to achieve outcomes.  
The Government Finance Officers Association recommends that these program 
outcomes be linked to agency strategic plans (Government Finance Officers 
Association 2005), making performance budgeting part of the broader effort of 
performance management.  This reform has been widely endorsed by a variety of 
groups, including the Government Accounting Standards Board, the Government 
Finance Officers Association, the International City/County Managers Association, 
the National Conference of State Legislatures, and the National Academy of Public 
Administration.  Further, the federal government is increasingly requiring 
performance measures and evaluation as a condition of its grants.     
  
Legislatures Lag in Using Performance Information 
 Although a number of legislatures have passed bills endorsing a results based 
management and budgeting process, several recent studies have shown that 
legislatures lag behind the executive branch and administrative agencies in actually 
using  performance  information.   Conducting  a survey of all the states, Melkers and  
                                                          
1 This report will refer to the reform by its generic name, performance-based budgeting.  This type 
of reform, however, is called by a variety of other names: results based budgeting, purchasing 
results, etc.   
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Willoughby (2004) found that budget and administrative staff ranked legislative use 
of performance information around 1.5 for changing appropriations levels and 1.9 for 
changing the substance or tone of debate among legislators (on a scale from 1 to 4).  
By comparison, use of performance for improving agency management averaged 
2.76.  These findings are similar to those from the Government Performance Project 
which found that state “managing for results” processes were dominated by the 
executive branch (Moynihan 2002).  Reviews of the federal implementation of 
performance management systems are similar.  Although the U.S. Congress passed 
the Government Results and Performance Act in 1993, they too have struggled to 
capitalize on this involvement and by most accounts the use of this information by 
Congress has been haphazard at best (Joyce 2003; Radin 1998; Kettl 1995; Foreman 
1995). 
 Although a lack of legislative engagement may be less a problem for internal 
agency management and strategic planning, legislatures are central to budgeting and 
resource allocation decisions.  Given that legislatures lag in their use of performance 
information, it is not surprising that several studies and two national surveys show 
that performance-based budgeting has lagged behind performance-based management 
(Congressional Budget Office 1993; Jordan and Hackbart 1999; Joyce 1999; Melkers 
and Willoughby 1998; Melkers and Willoughby 2004). 
 
An Old Ambivalence about Legislatures 
 The problem of legislative engagement has a long history.  Its roots go back 
to the early 20th Century with the institution of the executive budget process.  In the 
late 18th and 19th century, budgeting was almost entirely the province of legislatures.  
However, in the face of rising urbanization, industrialization, westward expansion, 
and global competition, there was an increasing demand for a government that was 
efficient.  The legislative budgeting process came to be viewed as fragmented and 
corrupt, unable to meet the needs of a modern administrative state (Burkhead 1956; 
Wildavsky and Caiden 2001).   
 In the early 1900s, Progressive reformers proposed an “executive budget 
process” transferring significant authority for developing budgets to the governors at 
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the state level and enhancing executive staff capacity to develop and oversee the 
development of budgets.  Legislatures were admonished to refrain from 
micromanagement and to focus on broad policy goals rather than involving 
themselves in the intimate details of budgeting (Brownlow 1949; Burkhead 1956; 
Rosenthal 1998).  The federal government as well as most states adopted the 
executive budget process and strengthened executive capacity.  However, this transfer 
of authority and capacity for budgeting created a rift: legislatures retained their 
historic authority for oversight and final approval of the budget, but in many states, 
the capacity to develop and monitor the budget resided primarily with the executive 
branch.   
 Since then, reformers have made a number of efforts to improve performance 
and accountability in budgeting; however, the dialogue has been almost entirely 
between the executive branch and administrative agencies.  Legislatures have been on 
the periphery of the reforms – often creating frustration when they failed to embrace a 
reform, but rarely invited to the table during design or implementation.  Reviewing 
some of these previous reform efforts suggests that ignoring the legislature is not a 
good strategy. 
In the 1960s, many states and the federal government attempted to adopt a 
budgeting reform known as Planning Programming Budgeting Systems (PPBS).  This 
reform required designation of expenditures by programmatic objectives and entailed 
a process of comprehensive planning and analysis for resource allocations.  Although 
information overload most likely doomed this reform from the beginning, a further 
problem was that the initiative was actively resisted by legislatures.  At the federal 
level, the reform met “ferocious”2 resistance from Congress, was never incorporated 
into legislative decision-making, and thus had no impact on actual resource allocation 
decisions (Schick 1973; Botner 1970; Mosher 1969; Gross 1969; Gorham 1968).   
The problem at the federal level was mirrored at the state level (Sallack and Allen 
1987; Mosher 1969).  In a review of PPBS, one noted scholar observed:  
The fourth difficulty [in implementing PPBS] is the virtual vacuum in 
most PPB literature concerning the relationship of the system to the 
legislative body, its impact upon the separation of powers.  
                                                          
2 Word used by Mosher (1969). 
Legislative Influences on Performance-Based  
Budgeting Reform  
 
 
 5
And then: 
 
This is no discredit to PPBS, for the same has been true of almost 
every budgetary reform proposal of the last half-century.  I have the 
impression, too, that there has not been much change in the nature of 
budgetary presentations, the structure of appropriations, or the nature 
of Congressional review.  In fact, most of the PPB literature simply 
ignores the legislative body, although much of it refers to crosswalks 
from the program structure to this budget; and one or two documents 
addressed to the states propose that appropriations be modified to 
accord with the programs. (Mosher 1969, 164) 
 
 Zero Base Budgeting (ZBB), the following reform, encountered similar 
problems.  Although Georgia was the flagship state for the reform, in a 1978 study of 
its implementation, Thomas Lauth quoted a legislative budget office staff member as 
saying: “we throw most of that [ZBB] stuff in the can” (Lauth 1978).    At the federal 
level, an early report on ZBB notes: “It is unclear how involved congressional 
committees will become in the zero-base process.  Reportedly those appropriations 
subcommittees which have experimented with zero-based justifications are less than 
enamored with the results.” (Haider 1977, 406)  Again, as with PPBS, lack of 
legislative engagement meant that administrators expended much time evaluating 
their programs, only to have budgetary decisions be made by legislative bodies in 
exactly the same way as prior to the reform (Herzlinger 1979; McCaffery 1981; 
Lauth 1978; Draper and Pitsvada 1981; Haider 1977).  Although these reforms faced 
problems other than legislative engagement, legislative resistance created a 
significant barrier to implementation.  Without legislative engagement and use of the 
information produced in budgeting, the time and effort spent on the analysis of 
budget alternatives was called into question.   
 
The Debate over Legislative Capacity and Authority 
 An ongoing debate is whether legislatures have the capacity to be equal and 
effective partners in governing in the first place.  The debate centers around two key 
questions:  first, do the legislators themselves need to be more “professional,” and 
second, do the legislative staff and support services need to be more “professional.”  
The first question is more intensely debated than the second.  On the one hand, some 
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argue that a full-time, relatively well paid legislative body will attract more talented 
legislators who are able to give policymaking their full attention.  Such legislators 
will be able to make policy decisions themselves and will not have to relinquish as 
much of the decision-making to staff (Rosenthal 1998).   The debates over term limits 
closely align with those over professionalism.  The arguments against term limits is 
that they will shift authority to the staff, bring in inexperienced legislators who do not 
have a deep understanding of policy or long term perspective, and shift power to the 
executive branch and administrative agencies(Greenblatt 2006, 2005).  
 On the other hand, those who advocate for “citizen legislatures” point out that 
people who regard politics as their profession are likely to be much more worried 
about losing an election than those who have another profession.  As a result a 
professional legislature might be much more hesitant to take on difficult issues than a 
citizen legislature.  Further, some scholars have observed that legislators who are full 
time might be much more likely to micromanage agency activities rather than to 
prioritize key policy initiatives and set broad policy objectives.  Rosenthal attributes 
some of the more recent decline in faith in legislative bodies, and subsequent moves 
toward term limits and other restrictions on legislative activities, to the problems 
created by citizen distrust of professional legislators (Squire 1993; Rosenthal 1998).  
Some analyses have found that higher legislative pay is associated with increased 
spending on developmental policies (indicating a tendency towards pork barrel 
spending) rather than state-wide redistributive policies (Barrilleaux and Berkman 
2003).   
 Similarly, a study of term limits found that they lead legislators to be less 
interested in “pork barrel” projects and more apt to make decisions based on 
“conscience” and state-wide needs (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 1998).  Specifically 
relating to performance-based budgeting, some scholars have suggested that the new 
legislators brought in by term limits might be more reliant on performance 
information because they do not have the same institutional knowledge of how an 
agency works or are more open to the ideas of using performance information 
(Grizzle and Pettijohn 2002).  
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 Having professional legislators is considered distinct from legislative 
responsibility for budgeting or from having professional staff support.  For instance, 
in states such as South Carolina and Texas, the legislators are not considered highly 
professional.  However, the legislature has significant institutional authority over 
budgeting as well as staff capacity to evaluate budget requests.  In contrast, some 
states may have a highly professional legislature, but less authority over the budget.  
The Texas Legislative Budget Board has around 136 staff involved in budgeting as 
well primary institutional responsibility for developing a budget (Bland and Clarke 
2001).  In South Carolina, the staff of a joint committee composed of the legislative 
leadership and the Governor oversees the revenue estimate, the development of the 
budget, as well as ongoing financial management (Whicker 1991). 
Some research has shown that legislative responsibility for budgeting appears 
to be connected to increased legislative concern about agency efficiency and to 
making more responsible budgetary decisions (Abney and Lauth 1998, 1987).  Along 
the same lines, having professional legislative staff support is generally perceived 
positively (Rosenthal 1998) and is thought to be important for the implementation of 
performance management reforms specifically (Grizzle and Pettijohn 2002).  Thus, as 
states consider how to improve budgetary practices in legislative bodies, a further 
consideration might be the importance of legislative authority or capacity. 
 
An Analysis of Legislatures and Their Influence on the Use of 
Performance Measures in Management and Budgeting 
  
 The analysis that follows examines three primary research questions:  
● Is there any quantitative evidence that legislatures actually matter in 
performance-based management or budget reform?  If so, at what stage?  
 
● What does the legislature need to do to improve implementation of the 
reform?   
 
● Does professionalism at the legislator or staff level or increases in 
legislative responsibility for budgeting improve implementation of 
reform?   
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 Reformers working on performance-based budgeting have probably made a 
more serious effort to engage legislatures from the beginning than in previous 
reforms.  Certainly, as noted earlier, a number of states have passed legislation 
endorsing the reform.  However, as evidenced by Georgia’s experience, adoption of 
legislation has not proved sufficient to stimulate serious implementation.  In 1993, 
the Georgia legislature passed performance legislation, SB 335, and for many years in 
Georgia, performance information was attached to the executive budget presentation; 
however, as with previous reforms, the legislature never used the information nor is it 
clear that the information was extensively used by the executive office.  Once again 
lack of legislative (and possibly executive) engagement called into question the time 
and effort spent collecting the material in the first place.   
 A second wave of effort to engage states in performance management in 
budgeting includes the National Conference of State Legislatures’ effort to help 
legislatures assimilate the reform and actually use performance information (National 
Conference of State Legislatures 2003).  However, after a century of neglect, efforts 
to figure out how legislatures should engage such a reform, given the variety of 
capacities and institutional arrangements, are still in an early stage.  History suggests 
that legislative involvement is important, but this evidence is only anecdotal.  Further, 
engaging legislatures in performance reform can be considered part of a broader 
debate over efforts to extend legislative authority and capacity. 
 
Methods 
 This analysis examines these issues by drawing on a national survey of the 
states conducted by Julia Melkers and Katherine Willoughby.  Melkers and 
Willoughby sent surveys to 121 budget staff in the executive and legislative branches 
in each state.  60 total (50 percent) responded from 36 states.  However, because of 
incomplete surveys, only 31 to 38 can be used in the analysis.  Melkers and 
Willoughby also sent surveys to 435 agency staff and 152 or 35 percent responded 
from 48 states – giving a substantially larger sample size than the budget officers.  
Models for both sets of respondents are reported; however, when considering 
reliability, the agency staff responses are likely more reliable because of the relative 
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size of the dataset.  However, both datasets are analyzed to see if there is consistency 
in the responses across different dependent variables and to assess differences in 
perspective.  In general, the more consistent the effects across different respondents 
and across different aspects of the reform, the more confidence one might have that a 
particular variable is important in implementation.  
The surveys of the budget officers and agency staff ask for an assessment of 
how well different aspects of performance-based management and budgeting have 
been implemented in each state as well as assessments of the level of involvement of 
the legislature, the executive, and others in administrative leadership positions.  The 
data from this survey are paired with information from the U.S. Census and the 
Council of State Governments’ Book of the States 2000-2001 to build variables that 
reflect differences in legislative organization, executive power, and the political 
environment across the states. 
 The analysis that follows focuses on the effects of legislative oversight, 
legislative budget responsibility, and legislative professionalism across several 
dimensions of implementation of performance management reform, including:   
● Effective use of performance measures in agency management practices, 
although such practices may not be widespread (“Effective Use of PM”); 
 
● Extent of effective use of performance measures across the agency or 
government (“Extent of Effective Use of PM”); 
 
● Use of performance measures in legislative budget debates and 
deliberations (“Budget Index”); 
 
● Use of performance measures generally in budgetary decision-making 
(legislative and agency) and extent of use in budgeting (“PM Vital” and 
“Extent of PM Use”). 
 
 Some of these measures do overlap; however, the reason for using these types 
of measures it two fold – first seeing the same institutional effects across multiple 
dimensions of implementation suggests that the effects are robust and not simply an 
anomaly associated with a particular set of measures; second, although more 
speculative, differences across these measures and between budget officers and 
agency staff can indicate subtle differences in the factors that influence the success of 
implementation of a performance management reform.  
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 The analysis also adds a number of “control variables” including 
gubernatorial power and engagement, political division, and demographic 
heterogeneity of the population in the state.  The models also control for an initial 
level of implementation by assessing whether the state has a law mandating 
implementation and whether the state has taken initial steps to implement the reform 
(“PM Basics”).  Details on the methodology and the variables tested are described in 
the Appendix.   
 
Findings 
 Overall, the models show some fairly consistent responses for several key 
variables.  For both agency staff and budget officers, legislative oversight of 
performance reform corresponds with a stronger assessment of implementation across 
all dimensions of the reform.  The legislative oversight variable is created from a 
specific question in the Melkers and Willoughby survey that asks respondents to 
identify the various stakeholders in state government that “verify performance 
measures or performance data for accuracy, reliability, relevance and validity.”  If the 
respondent identified a legislative auditor or legislative budget office staff (as 
opposed to executive auditor, executive budget staff, external government auditor, 
agency staff, external board, government oversight department or division, or state 
auditor) as taking this role,3  then they were also significantly more likely to be 
positive in their assessment of the level of active use of performance information in 
management, legislative budgeting and general budgeting practices.   
The effect of this legislative oversight variable is particularly strong in 
measures assessing extent of use of performance measures and in assessments of use 
of performance measures in budget processes.  Budget officers are also more likely to 
give  a  positive  assessment  of  implementation  in legislative budgeting processes if  
                                                          
3 Respondents had the option of checking all that applied, so the reference group for the dummy 
variable is all respondents who did not identify a legislative role in overseeing the development of 
performance measures. 
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budgetary responsibility is shared between the executive and legislative branches.  An 
executive oversight measure equivalent to legislative oversight was created for 
executive office staff.  Although less consistent, executive oversight also appears to 
have a positive effect on the assessments of both sets of respondents. 
 On the other hand, the more conventional measures of legislative 
professionalism, such as long session length, high expenditures on staff support, or no 
term limits generally have a negative effect or no effect.  Meanwhile gubernatorial 
power, an index measure of both gubernatorial political control over the legislature 
(margin of same party control within the legislature) as well as institutional 
authorities (veto power, budgetary authority, appointment power and tenure in 
office), factors strongly and positively in agency responses but seems to have little 
effect or even a negative effect on budget officer assessments.   
Integration of Performance into Management.  Tables 1 and 2 show the 
effects of a series of variables on agency level management practices -- specifically, 
respondents were asked to assess how effective performance measures are in 
changing agency strategies, reducing duplicative services, improving service quality, 
or increasing awareness of factors affecting performance.  In the second model, they 
were asked to assess the extent of such practices across their agency (for agency staff) 
or across agencies (for budget staff) (see Appendix for details on the questions used 
to construct this variable).  Although there are some important differences between 
the budget officers and agency staff, the main trend for both sets of respondents is 
consistent with the one described above:  a legislative oversight role in verifying 
performance measures corresponds with a positive assessment of the use of 
performance in management practices.   This effect is not significant in the first 
model for both agency staff and budget officers; however, this is in part because of 
multicollinearity with several other independent variables.  Removing several of 
these variables has little effect on the overall power of the model, but causes 
legislative oversight to become significant at .10.  In assessing the extent of use of 
these management practices, legislative oversight is both stronger in its effect and 
significant at .01 for budget officers and .05 for agency staff.  By way of contrast, 
executive  oversight,  a  measure  that  is  the  equivalent  of  legislative  oversight,  is  
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TABLE 1.  AGENCY STAFF ASSESSMENT OF USE OF PM IN MANAGEMENT  
 (1) (2) 
  
Effective 
Use of PM 
 
Effective 
Use of PM 
Extent of 
Effective 
Use 
Extent of 
Effective 
Use 
Professional Legislators     
    Number of Legislators .002  -.001  
 (1.12)  (1.21)  
    Days in Session -.001 -.001 -.002 -.002 
 (1.40) (1.58)† (2.17)** (1.92)* 
    Term Limits .597 .537 .135 .240 
 (4.08)*** (3.63)*** (0.83) (1.62)† 
Staff Support     
    Staff Index -.232 -.429 -.126 -.177 
 (.32) (.64) (.17) (.25) 
Legislative Responsibility and Oversight 
    Legislative Bill .124 .044 .072 .067 
 (1.03) (.34) (.54) (.54) 
    Legislative Oversight .168 .202 .305 .289 
 (1.57)† (1.77)* (2.70)*** (2.67)*** 
Gubernatorial Power and Oversight 
    Gubernatorial Power  .533 .420 .334 .375 
 (3.72)*** (2.43)** (1.98)** (2.54)** 
    Executive Oversight .290 .317 .049 .030 
 (2.66)*** (2.99)*** (.45) (.28) 
Basic Elements of Reform     
    PM Basics -.401 -.387 -.489 -.481 
 (3.47)*** (3.35)*** (4.34)*** (4.20)*** 
Political/Control Variables     
    Split Legislative Control .478 .455 .185 .193 
 (3.88)*** (3.65)*** (1.27) (1.32) 
    Population Heterogeneity Index 5.546 5.206 3.063 4.177 
 (3.38)*** (2.86)*** (1.31) (2.15)** 
    Citizen Ideology -.005  -.005  
 (1.14)  (1.12)  
    Government Ideology .004 .002 .008 .006 
 (1.42) (1.12) (2.92)*** (2.96)*** 
    Expenditures per capita  .108 .101 .022 .040 
 (2.30)** (2.04)** (0.41) (0.74) 
    Ln State Population .091 .117 .221 .186 
 (0.78) (1.08) (1.73)* (1.52)† 
    South -.339 -.302 -.403 -.368 
 (1.90)* (1.75)* (2.01)** (1.90)* 
    Constant -2.635 -2.350 -1.702 -2.176 
 (1.37) (1.08) (0.81) (1.06) 
    Observations 130 130 124 124 
    R-squared .40 .38 .41 .40 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.     
†significant at 15%; *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
See Appendix for variable definitions and sources. 
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TABLE 2.  BUDGET OFFICERS ASSESSMENT OF USE OF PM IN MANAGEMENT   
 ---------------------(1)-------------------- ---------------------(2)-------------------- 
 Effective 
Use of 
PM 
Effective 
Use of 
PM 
Effective 
Use of 
PM 
Extent of 
Effective 
Use 
Extent of 
Effective 
Use 
Extent of 
Effective 
Use 
Professional Legislators 
    Number of Legislators 0.001   -0.000   
 (0.20)   (0.02)   
    Days in Session -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 0.002 0.003 0.002 
 (1.86)* (1.55) (1.92)* (1.23) (1.73)* (1.68) 
    Term Limits 0.310 0.284 0.352 0.652 0.654 0.812 
 (1.60) (1.55) (2.06)* (1.63) (1.98)* (2.84)*** 
Staff Support 
    Staff Index -3.542 -1.999 -1.937 -3.742 -3.636 -2.730 
 (1.87)* (1.38) (1.27) (0.94) (1.43) (1.04) 
Legislative Responsibility and Oversight 
    Legislative Bill -0.410 -0.389 -0.293 -0.418 -0.416 -0.471 
 (2.16)** (2.08)** (1.97)* (1.14) (1.15) (1.71) 
    Legislative Oversight 0.225 0.246 0.296 0.546 0.548 0.519 
 (1.46) (1.82)* (2.22)** (2.03)* (2.27)** (2.20)** 
Gubernatorial Power and Oversight 
    Gubernatorial Power  -0.347 -0.245 0.013 -0.060 -0.057 -0.154 
 (1.30) (0.89) (0.07) (0.17) (0.16) (0.65) 
    Executive Oversight 0.076 0.086 0.035 -0.176 -0.172 -0.232 
 (0.39) (0.44) (0.22) (0.46) (0.59) (0.80) 
Basic Elements of Reform 
    PM Basics -0.247 -0.253 -0.263 -0.654 -0.653 -0.653 
 (1.40) (1.50) (1.73)* (1.16) (1.21) (1.25) 
Political/Control Variables 
    Split Legislative Control 0.263 0.188 0.284 0.050 0.042 0.173 
 (1.12) (0.86) (1.46) (0.15) (0.14) (0.58) 
    Population Heterogeneity  
    Index 
-2.336 -3.911  2.083 1.974  
 (0.69) (1.29)  (0.35) (0.42)  
    Citizen Ideology 0.012   0.001   
 (1.23)   (0.03)   
    Government Ideology -0.008 -0.001  -0.007 -0.007  
 (1.29) (0.39)  (0.55) (1.75)*  
    Expenditures Per Capita  0.145 0.078 0.042 0.562 0.564 0.370 
 (1.46) (1.12) (0.58) (2.22)** (2.42)** (1.95)* 
    Ln State Population 0.263 0.188 0.135 0.620 0.613 0.457 
 (1.26) (1.03) (0.63) (1.20) (1.76)* (1.37) 
    South 0.428 0.379 0.172 -0.092 -0.092 -0.091 
 (2.09)** (1.75)* (1.21) (0.24) (0.27) (0.38) 
    Legislative Branch  
    Respondent 
0.083 0.051 0.021 -0.041 -0.041 -0.107 
 (0.42) (0.29) (0.12) (0.10) (0.11) (0.30) 
    Constant 0.312 1.893 0.545 -7.514 -7.404 -3.784 
 (0.08) (0.58) (0.16) (0.90) (1.21) (0.66) 
    Observations 38 38 38 35 35 35 
    R-squared 0.67 0.65 0.62 0.47 0.47 0.44 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   
See Appendix for variable definitions and sources. 
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strongly significant in the first model where agency staff assess the effectiveness of 
use of performance measures, but then is not significant in agency staff assessments 
of extent of use of performance.  Surprisingly, executive oversight is not significant 
in the budget officers’ assessments of implementation either.   
 While legislative oversight may have a consistent and positive effect, 
measures of legislator professionalism have a fairly consistent “negative” effect.  For 
agency staff respondents, shifting from a non-term limited legislature to a term-
limited legislature leads to a 20 percent improvement in the respondents’ assessment 
of effective use of performance measures for agency management (Table 1).4  This 
measure also suffers from multicollinearity, in particular it is negatively associated 
with a liberal citizen ideology, one of the control variables.  Dropping the ideology 
variables does not dramatically change the significance of the models, but does make 
term limits significant.  In general, term limits are associated with citizen legislatures, 
or legislatures where the legislators do not view political office as their main 
profession (Rosenthal 1998).  Consistent with the term limits findings, most of the 
models also show a negative relationship between “days in session” and effective 
implementation.  In other words, the longer the legislature meets, again a 
characteristic of a professional legislature, the more likely the agency or budget 
officers are to negatively assess the level of implementation in their state.  The one 
exception to this story is that budget officers assessing extent of effective 
implementation across agencies are more likely to identify widespread use of 
performance in management practices if the legislature serves for longer days in 
session.  However, given that every other measure shows a negative relationship 
between days in session and budget officers, this effect may be an anomaly.    
 The effect of the staff index, which captures spending on staff and number of 
staff, is also consistently negative although in only one case is it significant.  The 
existence of the legislative oversight variable does suggest the importance of staff in 
reviewing performance information – but staff input may more about “quality” or a
                                                          
4 These were measured on a scale from 1 to 4.  So a .597 increase on this scale (over a half a point 
increase) is 19.9 percent.   
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careful allocation of staff resources to important tasks rather than the raw “quantity” 
of staff available to the legislature.   
 Finally, one might expect the passage of a law to implement performance-
based management to affect implementation positively.  However, having a law on 
the books does not seem to have any significant effect on agency staff assessments of 
level of implementation and has a negative effect on budget officer assessments of 
implementation.  This finding is of course in keeping with Georgia’s experience 
where passage of legislation requiring performance reporting did not necessarily 
translate into agencies actually using the information for management practices. 
Use of Performance in Legislative Budget Deliberations.  In Table 3, the 
indices being assessed capture the extent to which performance measures inform 
legislators’ deliberations and in particular budgetary decision-making (see Appendix 
for the questions used to construct this index).  Not surprisingly, legislative oversight 
in the development, evaluation, and audit of performance measures has a consistent 
and positive effect on the use of performance measures in legislative deliberations.  
Also, a higher level of legislative responsibility for budgeting has a significant and 
positive effect in budget officers’ assessments of legislative use of the reform.5  This 
budgetary responsibility variable is associated with states like Texas, New Mexico, 
and South Carolina, where the legislature has a greater responsibility for estimating 
revenues, developing the budget, and overseeing state financial activities.  This 
finding suggests that legislatures with active oversight as well as active budgetary 
responsibility are likely to be active users of performance information -- both 
involved in and responsible for the reform.  The finding that legislative responsibility 
for reform leads to use of the information in policymaking is consistent with Abney 
and Lauth’s (1998) research which indicated that legislative responsibility for 
budgeting leads legislators to become more interested in agency efficiency.  This 
finding  is  also  consistent  with  research which showed that integrating performance  
                                                          
5 This variable is added to models assessing legislative use of the information and budget impacts 
since it assesses the level of responsibility the legislature has for budget decision-making.  Abney 
and Lauth provide theoretical and empirical support for its importance in legislative decision-
making.  The budget responsibility is not included in the other models.  The measure for 
legislative budget responsibility is in part the inverse of the gubernatorial power measure.  
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TABLE 3.  AGENCY STAFF/BUDGET OFFICERS ASSESSMENT OF PM USE IN LEGISLATIVE 
BUDGET PROCESSES  
 --Agency Staff-- ---------------------Budget Officers-------------------- 
 Legislative 
Budget Index  
Legislative 
Budget Index 
Legislative 
Budget Index 
Legislative 
Budget Index 
Professional Legislators     
    Number of Legislators -0.001 0.001   
 (0.93) (0.57)   
    Days in Session -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 
 (2.10)** (1.82)* (2.06)* (1.15) 
    Term Limits -0.095 0.209 0.139 0.069 
 (0.64) (0.97) (0.81) (0.45) 
Staff Support     
    Staff Index 0.303 -1.057 0.266 -0.086 
 (0.40) (0.53) (0.23) (0.07) 
Legislative Responsibility and Oversight 
    Shared Budget Responsibility 0.199 0.749 0.856 0.701 
 (1.25) (2.29)** (2.57)** (2.28)** 
    Legislative Bill 0.171 -0.522 -0.529 -0.428 
 (1.09) (3.02)** (3.24)*** (2.96)*** 
    Legislative Oversight 0.317 0.574 0.594 0.611 
 (2.46)** (4.55)*** (5.06)*** (5.27)*** 
Gubernatorial Power and Oversight 
    Gubernatorial Power  0.333 -0.545 -0.489 -0.528 
 (2.10)** (3.35)*** (2.86)** (2.90)** 
    Executive Oversight 0.244 0.252 0.269 0.241 
 (2.11)** (1.75) (2.12)* (1.85)* 
Basic Elements of Reform     
    PM Basics -0.037 -0.658 -0.679 -0.600 
 (0.28) (3.39)*** (4.10)*** (4.21)*** 
Political/Control Variables 
    Split Legislative Control -0.001 -0.063 -0.143 -0.071 
 (0.01) (0.23) (0.56) (0.29) 
    Population Heterogeneity  4.622 -6.179 -7.865 -7.049 
 (1.91)* (2.14)* (3.64)*** (3.35)*** 
    Citizen Ideology -0.000 0.008   
 (0.02) (0.82)   
    Government Ideology 0.002 -0.001 0.004  
 (0.93) (0.20) (1.42)  
    Expenditures Per Capita  -0.074 0.165 0.106 0.106 
 (1.57) (1.62) (1.84)* (1.68) 
    Ln State Population 0.084 0.120 0.053 0.061 
 (0.66) (0.57) (0.34) (0.37) 
    South -0.289 0.023 -0.048 0.067 
 (1.19) (0.11) (0.22) (0.37) 
    Legislative Branch Resp.  0.135 0.131 0.178 
  (1.12) (1.23) (1.70) 
    Constant -1.406 4.800 6.568 6.054 
 (0.60) (1.21) (2.46)** (2.12)* 
    Observations 116 31 31 31 
    R-squared 0.26 0.89 0.88 0.87 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
See Appendix for variable definitions and sources. 
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measures into legislative processes leads to a more substantive legislative debate over 
policy issues (Stanford 1992).   
 This particular model does raise questions of causation, since both legislative 
use and staff oversight could be part of a larger holistic push by the legislature to 
actively incorporate performance information into their processes.  In other words, 
causation could be simultaneous. Still, it seems more likely that the audit, oversight, 
and development of measures takes place prior to the use of performance measures in 
“changing the substance or tone of discussion among legislators about agency 
budgets” or “changing appropriations levels.”  Also, the consistency of legislative 
oversight across all the measures, even those that are assessments of agency use of 
performance information, seems to indicate that legislative oversight might be a 
pivotal factor in the implementation of the reform.   
Ironically, the adoption of legislation supporting performance reform again 
has no effect on the dependent variable or in the budget officers’ assessment, a 
negative effect, suggesting that legislative endorsement of the reform is quite a 
different matter from actual integration into legislative processes.  Gubernatorial 
power has a positive influence over agency assessments of legislative use of the 
reform but a negative influence over budget officers’ assessments – a mixed finding.  
Again, consistent with previous findings, professionalism measures either have no 
statistically significant effect or a statistically significant negative effect.   
 Use of Performance Information in Budget Decisions Generally.  Finally, in 
Table 4, two binary variables are used to assess the impact of legislative oversight 
and professionalism on whether performance measures are “vital in budget decision-
making” and whether greater than 50 percent of programs in agencies use 
performance in budget decision making or less than 50 percent do.  These two models 
are only for agency staff as the budget officer sample size creates problems for the 
econometric technique (logit) used to test these dependent variables.   
Although this measure shows weaker relationships, generally the major trends 
are consistent.  The legislative oversight measure proves significant and consistent 
across  the  models,  while  indicators  of  legislative professionalism generally have a  
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TABLE 4.  AGENCY STAFF ASSESSMENT OF PM USE IN GENERAL BUDGET 
PROCESSES (LOGIT) 
  
PM Vital to Budgeting 
Extent Use of PM for 
Budgeting 
Professional Legislators   
    Days in Session -0.005 -0.002 
 (1.23) (0.60) 
    Term Limits 1.106 0.634 
 (1.89)* (1.21) 
Staff Support   
    Staff Index -3.641 0.714 
 (1.28) (0.23) 
Legislative Responsibility and Oversight 
    Shared Budget Responsibility -0.248 0.713 
 (0.38) (1.17) 
    Legislative Bill 0.149 -0.325 
 (0.28) (0.68) 
    Legislative Oversight 1.324 0.922 
 (2.79)*** (2.08)** 
Gubernatorial Power and Oversight   
    Gubernatorial Power  1.573 1.527 
 (1.89)* (2.02)** 
    Executive Oversight 0.527 0.289 
 (1.17) (0.68) 
Basic Elements of Reform   
    PM Basics -0.340 -1.191 
 (0.71) (2.66)*** 
Political/Control Variables   
    Split Legislative Control 0.360 1.300 
 (0.58) (2.02)** 
    Population Heterogeneity  20.866 5.497 
 (2.39)** (0.71) 
    Government Ideology 0.013 0.022 
 (1.27) (2.16)** 
    Expenditures per capita  0.375 -0.013 
 (1.10) (0.05) 
    Ln State Population 0.897 0.167 
 (1.84)* (0.36) 
    South -0.779 -0.174 
 (0.92) (0.21) 
    Constant -26.554 -8.323 
 (2.94)*** (1.03) 
    Observations 133 140 
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
See Appendix for variable definitions and sources. 
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negative effect.  Here the term limits variable is positive and significant in the first 
model, while the session index is not significant but continues to be consistently 
negative.  In this model, none of the executive variables seem to have a significant 
effect, although they continue to be positive.  In general, the use of performance 
measures in budgeting processes has generally lagged behind the use of performance 
measures for management purposes which may explain the lack of effect (Melkers 
and Willoughby 2001; Joyce 1999, 2003). 
 
A Package of Legislative Characteristics 
Overall, the results indicate a paradox:  legislative professionalism tends to 
have no significant effect or a statistically significant negative effect on the use of 
performance measures, while legislative oversight has a consistent (perhaps the most 
consistent of any variable) and statistically significant positive effect.  Examining the 
characteristics of legislatures with strong legislative oversight, one can see that 
legislative oversight of performance measures seems to coincide with legislative 
responsibility for budgeting but is not necessarily coincident with legislative 
professionalism.  Looking at the states where over 60 percent of respondents 
identified “legislative oversight” in the development of performance measures (see 
Table 5), four of the states, New Mexico, Florida, Texas, and Louisiana are all widely 
recognized for having well developed systems of performance-based budgeting and 
these are all legislatively driven processes.6  New Hampshire and South Dakota 
which are not widely recognized for their reforms and have weak legislatures may 
simply be anomalies.  South Carolina has a legislature that shares authority with the 
governor  for  development of the state budget, as do three other states in this list, and  
                                                          
6 In 2005 presentation by the National Conference of State Legislatures to the Georgia legislature, 
Harry Hatry cited Texas as having one of the most “mature” systems of performance management, 
and Louisiana as also having a well developed system.  New Mexico, although behind Texas and 
Louisiana was also noted as a “maturing system.”  Florida is cited in other places as having a 
(relatively) well developed performance system(Grizzle and Pettijohn 2002). 
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TABLE 5.  ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT 
 % 
Respondents 
Aware of  
Legislative 
Oversight 
 
Leg-Exec 
Shared 
Responsibility 
for Budgeting 
 
 
Professionalism 
rank by NCSL 
(1= high, 5=low) 
% Agency staff 
Identify Use of 
PM in Budget 
Decisions 
(Avg.) 
 
PM Vital in 
Budget 
Decisions 
(Avg.) 
New Mexico 0.67 Yes 4 0.67 0.67 
South Carolina 0.67 Yes 3 0.6 0.75 
Florida 0.75 Yes 2 0.5 0.5 
Texas 0.78 Yes 3 0.78 0.63 
Louisiana 1.00 Yes 3 0.8 0.6 
New Hampshire 1.00 No 5 0.33 0.33 
South Dakota 1.00 No 5 1 1 
Average     0.67 0.64 
Avg. All Resources    0.49 0.51 
 
South Carolina has recently been developing a system of performance-based 
budgeting.7   
Table 5 also shows that none of these states, with perhaps the exception of 
Florida, have highly professional legislatures, as ranked by the National Conference 
of State Legislators (a ranking that considers level of salary, time on the job, and staff 
support), although Texas does have a high level of staff support (12 staff per 
legislator during session).8  Three of the other states, New Mexico, Louisiana, and 
South Carolina have “moderate” levels of professionalism in the NCSL rankings, 
which includes around 3.1 staff per legislator, legislators that spend 70 percent of 
their time or less on the job, and legislative salaries averaging $35,326.  New 
Hampshire and South Dakota have low levels of legislative professionalism. 
The intriguing finding is that legislative engagement in overseeing 
performance measures, presumably through their staff, leads to better agency level 
use of performance measures in making management decision.  However, high levels 
                                                          
7 This variable was created by taking information from the 2000-2001 Book of the States (U.S. 
Census, The Council of State Governments 2000).  New Mexico also has a highly coordinated 
legislative-executive budgeting process.   
8 According to the NCSL rankings, a professional legislature is counted as one where there are 
approximately 8.9 staff per legislator, legislators spend 80 percent of their time on the job and are 
compensated at $68,599 or higher.   A moderately professional legislature is one where members 
spend 70 percent of the time on the job, are compensated approximately $35,326 and have a staff 
to member ratio of 3.1.  A non-professional legislature is compensated at around $15,984 per 
legislator, has 1.2 staff members and spends around 54 percent of their time on the job.  Georgia’s 
legislature falls between moderate to low levels of professionalism (in the same category as New 
Mexico).  
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of responsibility do not have to be paired with high levels of staff or legislator 
professionalism, which suggests that quality rather than quantity of legislative 
involvement might be important.  The package of legislative features that is 
associated with administrative efficacy in implementing the performance 
management reform, may be moderate or even low levels of legislative 
professionalism combined with significant engagement in oversight.  This legislative 
model is also evident in states such as Virginia, which has consistently received top 
rankings from the Government Performance Project for good administrative practices 
(Government Performance Project 2005c).  Virginia has high levels of legislative 
oversight through their Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission (JLARC), 
but only a moderately professional legislature. 
 
Conclusion 
 To return to the questions posed at the beginning of this report:  
● Is there any quantitative evidence that legislatures actually matter in 
this budgetary reform?  If so, at what stage?   
 
 A number of the models indicate that legislative oversight (which in turn 
would require legislative capacity and authority) does have a significant effect on the 
implementation of management and budgeting reform.  In particular legislative 
oversight is a robust and consistent variable, where similar variables of executive 
oversight are significant but less robust across all dimensions of the reform (other 
forms of oversight, including by the state auditor or by an “external organization,” 
were tested but had no significant effect on the results).  Legislative oversight was 
linked to legislative use of the information in budget deliberations and was a 
consistent institutional variable influencing use of performance in management and 
budget processes. 
● Does professionalism at the legislator or staff level improve 
implementation of reform?   
 
 There is little evidence that the key to improving implementation of the 
reform is an investment in a more professional legislature – if anything this research 
indicates that citizen legislatures are the more successful alternative in terms of 
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performance management and budgeting reform.  This latter point is important 
because legislatures bring important democratic values to our institutions which may 
conflict with managerial effectiveness – for instance legislatures represent a broad 
cross-section of viewpoints which means they may bring many competing points of 
view to a policy arena.   This research does not attempt to capture these effects!  
However, the findings do not support the idea that professional legislatures are 
particularly helpful for either the administrative implementation of the reform or even 
the legislative use of performance information.   
● What does the legislature need to do to improve implementation of 
the reform?   
 
 The key finding here is again that active legislative oversight in evaluating 
and verifying performance data may be critical.  The findings suggest that it is not 
enough for the legislature simply to endorse the reform through passage of a bill; 
rather, the legislature needs to actively engage in the use of performance information 
in order to encourage agency level implementation.  Given the history of budgetary 
reforms, this effect stands to reason – agencies have repeatedly invested enormous 
time and resources into budget reforms only to have them fall by the wayside.  
Legislative oversight may signal that decision-makers intend to actually use the 
information produced by agencies and to hold agencies accountable for results.  
Legislative engagement may also suggest that a reform is more likely to endure 
gubernatorial changes – since the reform is endorsed by more than one branch of 
government.   
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II. The Georgia Appropriations Committees Survey  
Introduction 
 In the spring and summer of 2005, thirty-two members of the Georgia House 
and Senate Appropriations Committees were interviewed in person or responded to a 
mail survey on their current decision-making practices, their use of budgetary 
information, and the types of information that they would like to see in the budget.9  
The survey was intended to help determine what information legislators currently use 
and what information they believe would be useful to them in the future.  
Interestingly, their responses indicate another way to interpret the data from the 
previous analysis.  Namely, the legislators suggest that they are more likely to trust 
information from their own internal sources.  Thus, active legislative oversight may 
produce information that legislators are more likely to use and may subsequently lead 
to more agency use of the information.   
 
Findings 
The Governor’s Budget Initiative and the FY05 Amended and FY06 Budget 
 First, when asking legislators about whether they were aware of the 
Governor’s efforts at budget reform – 81 percent indicated that they were aware of 
the reform; however, 63 percent indicated that they were not using any of the 
information produced.  When pressed in direct interviews, even fewer were able to 
identify characteristics of the reform, and it is likely that very few legislators at this 
time had any contact with the strategic planning, program designation and 
prioritization processes, or the performance measures that characterize the executive 
effort.   This finding is in keeping with a long history of reform efforts in Georgia and  
                                                          
9 All members of the House Appropriations Committee were contacted through a mail survey, of 
73 members 19 responded (26 percent response rate).  The 26 members of the Senate were 
contacted by phone or in person, and 13 agreed to be interviewed (50 percent response rate).  
Although only seven Democrats responded, once answers to questions that had obviously political 
implications were dropped (such as use of information by the Governor or Governor’s staff), their 
answers did not differ substantially from the others.  
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elsewhere that are conducted as dialogues between the executive branch and 
administrative agencies.  Although the Georgia legislature saw substantial turnover in 
the past two election cycles (in 2003 and 2005), of the members interviewed, only 
one was new and at least 20 had served for five years or more.  So inexperience is 
unlikely to have affected this response.   
 In terms of the existing budget information used (reported in Table 6), there is 
almost an even distribution of elements that the legislators might find most useful.  14 
ranked the recommended changes to baseline as one of their top two most useful 
information sources; 13 ranked object classes as most important; 11 placed program 
expenditure levels and agency organization and mission as top sources, and 10 
thought the expenditures over time were most useful.  Because of the evenness of 
response, the answers are to some degree ambiguous.  In general, the descriptions of 
agency mission  and organization tends to fall towards the bottom, the expenditures 
over time also seems less used, while the object class, program and changes to 
baseline tend to be more highly rated. 
 
TABLE 6.  Q: WHEN YOU BEGAN THE PROCESS OF REVIEWING THE FY05 AMENDED 
BUDGET AND THE FY06 BUDGET, WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IN THE 
GOVERNOR’S BUDGET BOOK WAS MOST USEFUL TO YOU?  (PLEASE RANK THE FOLLOWING 
(1-5) FROM MOST TO LEAST HELPFUL.  PLEASE USE A NUMBER ONLY ONCE) 
  
Q2a. 
Description 
of Agency 
Organization 
and Mission 
 
Q2b. 
Description of 
Object Class 
Expenditure 
Levels 
 
Q2c. 
Description of 
Programmatic 
Expenditure 
Levels 
Q2d. 
Descriptions of 
the Governor’s 
Recommended 
Changes to the 
Baseline Budget 
 
 
Q2e. 
Descriptions of 
Expenditures 
Over Time 
Rank as 1 4 8 8 7 3 
 13% 27% 27% 23% 10% 
Rank as 2 7 5 3 7 7 
 24% 17% 10% 24% 24% 
Sum 11 13 11 14 10 
Rank as 3 1 8 10 3 6 
 4% 29% 36% 11% 21% 
Rank as 4 7 4 6 5 7 
 24% 14% 21% 17% 24% 
Rank as 5 9 4 1 6 5 
 36% 16% 4% 24% 20% 
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What Information Would Legislators Like to See?   
 Although legislators seem to be uncertain about the Governor’s reform, as 
indicated in Table 7, they were highly interested in having access to better results 
information.  35 percent ranked program results as a top source of information that 
would help them make a more informed decision, 23 percent asked for unit costs and 
19 percent asked for performance measures or outcome measures.  Also of interest 
are input costs, which were not the top request of anyone but 11 made it their second 
request.  Interestingly, although one might expect legislators to ask for performance 
information at a district level, reporting based on district level performance and 
district level inputs were frequently ranked as least important.  38 percent ranked 
district level performance impact as their second to last priority and 35 percent 
ranked district inputs as their last priority. 
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What Sources of Information Do Legislators Currently Use and What Sources Do 
They Trust? 
 
 Both the answers to the survey and the more in depth interviews suggest that 
much of the legislator’s information about agency operations is from informal 
advisors and colleagues.  In contrast, legislators do not seem to trust lobbyists or non-
constituent interest groups.  In Table 8, legislators were asked “when you make a 
policy decision on a budgeting issue, which of the following [12 information sources] 
most heavily influences your decisions?”  Although the rankings did vary 
significantly, there are some general clusters of responses.  The “average rank” at the 
top of the table gives a sense of how highly, on average, legislators weight different 
information sources.  On average, legislators use their “kitchen cabinet” or an 
informal group of advisors most heavily (“average rank” of 4).  Looking at this 
another way, 53 percent (17 out of 32 respondents) identified this “kitchen cabinet” in 
their top three sources of information.  In the next tier, on average, the legislators 
ranked their legislative colleagues, legislative staff, the Governor, external research 
reports, and constituent interest groups about the same (average rank of “5”), 
although some of these were more likely to be ranked in the top three.  Over 30 
percent of respondents ranked the Governor, colleagues in the legislature and 
constituent interest groups in the top three.  The high ranking of the Governor has to 
be discounted somewhat since it reflects the partisan make-up of the sample. 
 Perhaps just as interesting is which groups legislators ranked last.  Only one 
legislator ranked lobbyists and interest groups as a top source and more dramatically, 
31 percent ranked lobbyists dead last.  Legislators also give lower average preference 
to information from individual constituents, recommendations provided by agency 
staff and agency executives, and recommendations by executive staff.  In interviews 
about their sources of information, some legislators indicated that constituents on an 
individual level may not be fully informed about the issues.  Also legislators may not 
want to appear that they are swayed by a single contentious voice.  The lower ranking 
for agency staff and agency executives, however, reflects a more general lack of trust 
of information from agencies.  In another question reported later, again, agencies fall 
at  the  bottom  of  trusted  information sources.  Interestingly, executive staff also are  
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ranked similarly to agency staff, despite this sample over-representing legislators 
from the Governor’s party. 
 Later in the survey, legislators answered a similar set of questions, this time 
more directly inquiring about the sources of information, legislators trust to confirm 
that an agency is running efficiently.  In any performance and evaluation system, a 
central question when assessing agency needs is whether the programs are being 
managed effectively and thus have a legitimate claim to request more funding, or 
whether there is “fat” in the system.  As shown in Table 9, the results from this 
question reiterate the finding that legislators do not really trust agencies to self-report 
honestly.  That agency-legislative relationships are generally antagonistic is a theme 
in other states as well (Grizzle and Pettijohn, 2002).    
The sources of information on agency effectiveness that legislators trust most 
are their own experiences and their own staff or affiliated staff such as the 
Department of Audits.  Second in priority are the informal network of advisors 
described in Table 4 – the “kitchen cabinet” and other legislators.  Here constituents 
provide an important source of information as well.  In interviews, several legislators 
mentioned that many of their judgments about agencies are based on what they hear 
from constituents about their interactions with the agency.  Again, as in the previous 
set of questions, agency directors and interest groups rank last as a source of 
information about agency efficiency and again, the executive staff rank at the bottom, 
despite the likely partisan bias of the respondents towards the executive.  The 
implication is that these sources, party affiliation notwithstanding, are perceived as 
having a conflict of interest, i.e., both the executive and the agencies have a political 
interest in showing good results and demonstrating that they are operating 
efficiently.10    
                                                          
10 Again, although the Governor is ranked “4” – this response is likely influenced by party 
affiliation and so may be unreliable.  More interesting is the contrast between the Governor and 
executive staff, which all legislators indicate are a less trusted source of information about agency 
efficiency.   
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TABLE 9.  Q:  WHAT SOURCES OF INFORMATION WOULD YOU TRUST TO CONFIRM TO 
YOU THAT AN AGENCY IS RUNNING EFFICIENTLY?  PLEASE RANK THE FOLLOWING 
INFORMATION SOURCES 1 THROUGH 5 WITH 1 BEING LOW RELIABILITY AND 5 BEING 
HIGH RELIABILITY. 
 Reliability 
1 Low-5 High 
Rank  
1 High – 11 Low 
Agency Director 2.88 9 
Governor 3.84 4 
Governor’s Staff 3.19 8 
Legislative Staff 3.94 3 
Department of Audits (Performance Reports) 4.09 2 
Key Constituents/Advisors  3.56 6 
Individual Constituents 3.41 7 
Interest Groups 2.84 10 
Other Legislators 3.72 5 
Personal Experience with Agency 4.63 1 
Agency Self-Reported Performance Information 2.50 11 
 
These final results are important in considerations of how to structure 
oversight.  As noted in the first part of the analysis, legislative oversight proves 
consistently important in the implementation of performance-oriented management 
reform.  These last two tables suggest that legislative oversight might be important 
because legislative staff are a trusted source of external information about agency 
performance.  In contrast, agency self-reporting, or even perhaps executive 
performance reporting might be perceived as having problems of conflict of interest.  
Legislative staff have less of a vested interest in showing that agencies are operating 
efficiently, and if anything, they may gain political currency by showing agencies are 
operating inefficiently – a bias in the opposite direction.   
 
Conclusion 
The findings in this section suggest that currently legislators are using an 
informal network of friends, constituents and colleagues to make decisions about 
policy in general, and budgeting specifically.  This finding is in keeping with a wide 
body of research about legislative heuristics.  The fundamental idea in performance-
based budgeting is to focus on programmatic results and attempt to bring more 
information to bear on policy debates.  The survey suggests that legislators would be 
receptive to additional information but that the source of information may be 
important.  Agencies and even executive staff may be perceived as having a conflict 
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of interest in terms of fairly reporting results data, while legislative staff or legislative 
agencies may be perceived as less biased, or at least biased in the direction of 
legislative interest.  This finding adds an additional dimension to the findings in the 
first part, suggesting that legislative oversight of the development of performance 
information might be so important to the reform because it creates a source of 
information that decision-makers and in particular legislative decision-makers trust 
and thus is more likely to inform the policy debate throughout government.  
● For Georgia, the findings in both sections indicate that the legislature 
might want to consider a renewed effort to build the capacity to 
effectively evaluate agency performance.   
 
Interestingly, the 1993 Budget Accountability Act did anticipate the need for 
increased legislative involvement and oversight by authorizing the creation of the 
Budgetary Responsibility Oversight Committee.  Yet, for a variety of reasons, 
performance reform continued to be almost exclusively the domain of the executive 
branch.  The results here suggest that renewing the effort to build a series legislative 
program evaluation capacity may have several benefits:  improving incentives for 
serious agency level implementation while also providing legislators with 
assessments from a trusted source of information.   
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III. Legislative Oversight 
 
 The results described in the first two sections actually suggest developing a 
systemic reform rather than just an information-based reform.  For instance, the 
passage of a legislative bill mandating that performance information be reported is 
not sufficient and may even have a negative effect on levels of implementation.  In 
keeping with Georgia’s experience, the mere production of information does not 
necessarily translate into actual use in agency decision-making and certainly does not 
translate into use of the information in budgeting.   
 A systems perspective, indicated by the legislative oversight and executive 
oversight variables in the analysis earlier, suggests that in addition to reporting 
information, states need to build a capacity to oversee, evaluate, and use performance 
information external to the agencies themselves.  In many respects this finding should 
be intuitive because an external capacity to evaluate means that legislative and 
executive actors then have the ability to hold agencies accountable.  Again, states 
where both agency and budget staff indicate high levels of internal use of 
performance information are also states where agency and budget staff indicate that 
there is a significant external effort to evaluate performance information.  Housing an 
audit and evaluation capacity in the legislative branch may be particularly critical.   
This section is intended to paint of picture of what  “legislative oversight” 
might look like in the context of performance-based budgeting reform by briefly 
examining three states described at the end of Section I, Florida, New Mexico, and 
Texas.  Other states such as South Carolina and Virginia are also known for having a 
significant legislative role in oversight of agencies, although recent budget reforms 
have been predominantly executive initiatives.   
 
Florida 
Overview of the Reform: 
 In 1994, Florida adopted a performance-based program budget reform, the 
Performance and Accountability Act (PB2).  PB2 was phased in over a seven-year 
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period with an average of five additional agencies beginning the process each year.  
Major components of this reform include:  
● Program budgeting giving agencies increased flexibility in their use of 
resources; 
 
● Agency development of long range plans that identify performance 
measures associated with each program over a five-year horizon; 
 
● Agency tracking of performance measures and inclusion of performance 
measures from long range plans in budget requests; 
 
● Executive approval of performance measures; 
 
● Legislative review of performance measures and adoption of performance 
targets in conjunction with the annual budget process; 
 
● Agency Inspectors General audit of performance measures; 
 
● Creation of the Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government 
Accountability (OPPAGA) to evaluate program performance. 
 
Legislative Role in Performance-Based Budgeting  
 Although the state uses an executive budget process and the governor has a 
line item veto, the Florida legislature continues to play a substantial role in setting 
budget priorities.   For instance, the initial revenue estimate is developed by the 
“Revenue Estimating Conference,” comprised of staff from the Office of the 
Governor, the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the Division of Economic 
and Demographic Research.   
 The 1994 performance-based budgeting reform designates roles for each 
branch.  Agencies are required to identify programs and a range of performance 
measures associated with each program in their long range plan (the equivalent of a 
strategic planning process).  Agencies then track these “banks” of performance 
measures over time and submit key measures as well as recommended performance 
standards or targets in their budget requests.  The Inspector General for each agency 
(who is appointed by the agency head) has responsibility for auditing agency 
performance measures for accuracy and reliability.  In the early years of the reform 
OPPAGA, the legislative evaluation agency also evaluated the validity of agency 
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performance measures; however, as agencies have taken ownership of the reform 
most of these audits have tapered off - except in cases where a legislator requests an 
investigation. “Substantive” legislative committees contribute to this process by 
approving the initial performance measures associated with each program, while 
executive branch staff oversee and approve annual agency designations of programs, 
measures, and proposed performance standards.   
 During budget consideration, budget committee staff assess agency 
performance measures in conjunction with the agency’s budget request.  The 
legislative budget process culminates with passage of two bills, a general 
appropriations act and a bill setting the proposed performance standards for each 
program.  Technically, these performance standards have the force of law, but serve a 
more general purpose of indicating legislative intent and seriousness about agency 
performance.   
The Florida legislature has also developed one of the best performance audit 
capacities in the country (Government Performance Project 2005a).  OPPAGA 
assesses programmatic progress in achieving the performance standards and provides 
a variety of other evaluations of program effectiveness.  When Florida initiated the 
PB2 reform in the 1990s, OPPAGA conducted regular performance evaluations 
assessing how well agencies were implementing the reform, as well as regular 
assessments of program effectiveness in agencies.  However, as the reform has 
evolved and agencies have taken ownership of performance driven decision-making, 
OPPAGA’s role has shifted to focus on conducting evaluations based on requests 
from legislators.   
 OPPAGA is governed by the Joint Legislative Auditing Committee, 
composed of five members of the House and five members of the Senate with 
rotating chairmanship.  The responsibilities of OPPAGA include: 
● Performance audits and policy reviews of government programs; 
 
● Follow up reviews to assess whether agencies have addressed previously 
identified problems; 
 
● Maintenance and updating of the Florida Government Accountability 
Report which encompasses descriptive and evaluative information about 
all major state programs (approx. 240 profiles); 
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● Technical assistance and reviews of agency accountability systems; 
 
● Research support for legislative committees. 
 
 Prior to consideration of the budget, OPPAGA generates an annual report that 
consolidates its program evaluations from the past year and then generates series of 
budgetary recommendations based on these reports.  (For the 2005 “Annotated 
Listing of Legislative Recommendations” to the budget see http://www.oppaga.state. 
fl.us/reports/r05-55s.html)  OPPAGA internal assessments suggest that agencies 
adopted 74 percent of their recommendations and the legislature adopted around 60 
percent (Florida Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability 
2005).  To do this work, the agency has approximately 100 staff members and had a 
budget of $8.3 million in FY2005.   
 
New Mexico 
Overview of the Reform 
 In 1999, the State of New Mexico adopted its Accountability in Government 
Act which required agencies to identify programs and then submit performance 
information for each program category as part of the budget process.  This reform 
was phased in over four years starting in 2000.  Key aspects of the reform include: 
● Agency development of strategic plans, identifying key programs and 
performance measures; 
 
● Program-based appropriations, giving agencies increased flexibility; 
 
● Agency budget requests that include historical performance information 
and performance targets for each program; requests for increases in 
resources or shifts in resources must be justified by changes in program 
results; 
 
● Performance information in appropriations bills; 
 
● Legislative Finance Committee evaluation of the implementation of the 
performance reform as well as agency performance.  These assessments 
and recommendations are consolidated into an annual report prior to 
consideration of budget;  
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● Emphasis on cost accounting to associate costs with programmatic 
outputs. 
 
(Sources:  New Mexico Legislative Finance Committee (2006); Williams (2005)) 
 
Legislative Role in Performance-Based Budgeting 
 The legislative branch in New Mexico has long had a significant role in 
developing the budget.  In forecasting the revenue estimate, like Florida, New 
Mexico uses a joint consensus process where staff from the departments of Taxation 
and Revenue, Finance and Administration, and Highway and Transportation as well 
as staff from the Legislative Finance Committee develop the estimates.  Further both 
the executive office and the Legislative Finance Committee (LFC) develop 
independent state budgets.  The Legislative Finance Committee guides legislative 
approval of the budget and provides extensive budget recommendations drawing on 
performance evaluations conducted throughout the year.  
The LFC, which is the primary mechanism for legislative oversight, was 
created in the 1950s and the committee is composed of 8 representatives from the 
House and 8 from the Senate.   Party membership is in proportion to the number of 
seats held in the body overall.  Chairmanship of the committee rotates between the 
House and Senate every two years.   The Committee has 36 staff, of which 31 are 
analysts or auditors and had a budget of approximately $3.5 million in FY 2006.   
 The New Mexico performance-based budgeting system requires agencies to 
develop strategic plans and to identify key programs and performance measures.  
Agencies are encouraged to work jointly with their executive budget analyst as well 
as with staff from the LFC in developing these measures.  Agency budget requests 
are required to include historical information about performance targets and all 
requests for changes to the budget must explain why amendments and additions will 
improve agency performance-based on identified performance measures.  The 
information on performance information and performance targets is kept in a 
statewide database.   
 The Legislative Finance Committee develops an independent budget based on 
the agency requests and recommends both budget allocations and performance 
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targets.  The Committee also develops an extensive narrative about agency and 
program performance based on performance information as well as previous program 
evaluations.  Examples of these documents can be found on the LFC webpage 
(http://legis.state.nm.us/lcs/lfc/lfcpublications. asp).  When considering the budget, 
the legislature adopts both appropriations levels and performance targets, which 
technically have the force of law.  At the end of the year, agencies submit an 
assessment to the database describing whether they managed to attain the requested 
performance targets.  This information is then available to legislators and staff to 
assess agency performance.  Performance measures themselves are evaluated for 
validity by LFC staff, but the LFC is still working on building the capacity to make 
such efforts more systematic. 
 
Texas 
Overview of the Reform 
 In 1991, Texas revised its budget process.  Previously, budgeting had been 
based on zero-based budgeting concepts.  The 1991 budget reform required agencies 
to engage in a strategic planning process for a six year time horizon and to identify 
programs and performance measures in conjunction with this process.  Programs and 
performance measures then link to budgeting and evaluation.  The focus of this 
reform was to better integrate agency planning and decision-making with budget 
decisions. Key elements of the reform include:   
● Agency development of six year strategic plans, in which they identify 
programs and program outcome, output, and explanatory measures; 
 
● Integration of agency goals, objectives, and selected outcome, output and 
explanatory measures into the legislative appropriations requests (LARs); 
 
● Reporting agency goals, objectives and selected performance measures in 
the budget documents; 
 
● Program level appropriations;  
 
● Legislative determination of performance targets as part of the budget 
process; 
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● Legislative Budget Board (LBB) assessments of agency progress towards 
performance targets; 
 
● Department of Audits certification of performance measures. 
 
Legislative Role in Performance-Based Budgeting 
Although the governor does present a budget recommendation, the 
legislature, through the LBB, has primary responsibility for developing the actual 
budget.  The LBB also has responsibility for evaluation of agency program 
performance.  The LBB traces its roots back to a 1949 reform when state law was 
amended to require state agencies to submit their budgets to the Board for review.  In 
1973, the Board’s mandate was expanded to include evaluation of agency programs.  
The LBB is governed by a ten member committee including the Lieutenant Governor 
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives who act as joint-chairmen of the 
Committee.  The Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee and the House 
Appropriations Committee and the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee 
receive an automatic appointment to the board.  In addition, two members of the 
House are appointed by the Speaker and three members of the Senate are appointed 
by the Lieutenant Governor.  The LBB received approximately $9.17 million in 
appropriations for its operations in FY 2006 and employs around 136 staff.   
Texas is considered to have one of the best performance systems overall, 
although the current governor is less supportive of the effort (Government 
Performance Project 2005b).  In the Texas performance management system, 
agencies develop strategic plans based on LBB criteria.  Programs are identified as 
“strategies” that are used to achieve agency goals and objectives, and programs 
provide the basis for budget allocations.  
The LBB is also a central actor in Texas’ biannual budget process.  Prior to 
consideration of the budget, the Board issues budget instructions to the agencies, 
which typically include the requirement to report historical information on 
performance measures.  Agencies submit their budget requests directly to the LBB 
and in addition, maintain performance information in the Automated Budget and 
Evaluation  System  of  Texas  (ABEST),  which is available for review by legislators  
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and staff.  The LBB designates selected performance measures for each program in 
an agency, and these “key” measures are included in their budget recommendation 
along with historical information on the budget and performance.  Over the years, 
legislators have become increasingly comfortable with using performance 
information as part of their debate over the budget (Bland and Clarke 2001), and the 
legislature sets performance targets in conjunction with the budget numbers as a part 
of the biannual budget bill.  In interim years, the LBB assembles an assessment of 
fiscal action taken by the legislature as well as annual and semi-annual assessments 
of agency progress in meeting key performance targets.  Copies of these reports can 
be found at the LBB webpage (http://www.lbb.state.tx.us/The_LBB/Access/ 
Other_Documents.htm#Perform).   
Also each year the Department of Audits identifies a set of agencies and 
audits their performance measures for validity and accuracy.  In previous years, the 
Department found that only around 50 percent of agency measures met criteria for 
appropriate validity and accuracy.   
 
Conclusion 
 These cases provide a snapshot of what legislative oversight systems might 
look like in the context of a performance budgeting reform.  Key similarities in these 
three states include: 
● The linkage of agency strategic plans to budget processes;  
 
● The designation of programs and performance measures for each 
program; 
 
● A system for auditing the validity of program measures; 
 
● Legislative designation of performance targets or standards; 
 
● Legislative staff (or legislative agency) development of program 
evaluations, which are used to inform the budget process.  
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Appendix 
Methodology 
 
 The basic model being tested looks at the effects of legislative and executive 
institutional variables on a series of survey-based measures that capture dimensions 
of performance-based management and budget reform implementation in each state.  
The question is whether the institutional variables have any effect on respondents 
assessment of the use of performance information in decision-making processes.   
 Tables A1-A3 describe the construction of the dependent variable indices, 
including the questions used in each index, and descriptive statistics for the index.  
Table A4 gives descriptive statistics for the binary variables used in the logit model 
assessing the influence of institutional variables on budgetary decision-making.  
Table A5 describes an index, “performance measurement basics,” that is used to 
control for the initial effort to implement the reform in each state.  The argument 
behind the inclusion of this variable is that some states might not truly be 
implementing performance-based reforms and thus the effects of other variables will 
tend to be weakened because respondents in these states are more likely to have a 
negative assessment of implementation.  All the models were tested with and without 
this variable and the effects were the same, with some small variations.  The general 
trend was that some independent variables lost a small amount of significance, which 
would follow from the argument that they are now absorbing the effects of states that 
never made a serious effort to implement the reform in the first place.  Table A6 
gives a description of all of the independent variables, the data sources, and where 
appropriate, a detailed description of how the variable was actually constructed.   
All of the linear regression models use robust standard errors to correct for 
heteroskedasticity that might arise from having multiple respondents from the same 
state.  Also, all of the variables were tested for intercorrelations that might create 
problems of multicollinearity.  There is substantial multicollinearity between a 
number of variables; however, the danger of multicollinearity is that some variables 
that should be significant do not appear significant.  To try to address this issue, most 
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models are presented in reduced forms, dropping intercorrelated variables that do not 
themselves seem to have an effect on the overall model.  
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TABLE A4.  BINARY MEASURE OF USE OF BUDGETING INFORMATION (FOR LOGIT) 
Agency Staff Only 
PM Vital:  Performance measures are a vital decision aid regarding 
budget issues. (Rated on a scale from 1 to 4; coded for analysis with 1 
for strongly agree/agree and 0 being disagree/strongly disagree) 
Agree:   80 
Disagree:  58 
N: 138 
Extent PM Use:  Extent to which performance measures are used in 
budgeting, including resource allocation or discussion about resource 
changes.  (Coded as 1 for “all programs;” “greater than 50% of 
programs;” as 0 for “less than 50% of programs,” “a few select 
programs,” and “no programs.”)   
Less than 50%:  66 
Greater than 50%: 82 
N: 148 
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TABLE A6.  INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Measure Methodology Source of Data 
Days in Session 
Index 
 
Based on King (2000); Following King’s methodology, 
the “days in session index” was created by taking the 
total days in session, including special sessions, for the 
legislature during the 1998-99 biennium and dividing 
by two.  Legislative days are counted as 7/5ths of a 
calendar day.  This annual number is then divided by 
total days in session of the U.S. Congress for 2000.   
U.S. Census (2005); 
The Council of State 
Governments (2000); 
U.S. Senate (2000); 
Congressional 
Quarterly (2000) 
Legislators Total number of legislators in the House and Senate for 
each state  
The Council of State 
Governments (2000)  
Legislative Term 
Limits 
Binary variable if term limits as of 1997. Rosenthal (1998), 75 
Expenditures 
Index/ Professional 
Legislature Index 
Based on King (2000); the total for legislative 
expenditures came from the U.S. Census of 
Governments 2000(U.S. Census Bureau 2004).  Total 
compensation per legislator was calculated by taking 
salary information which was added to per diem 
information multiplied times annual days in session 
(The Council of State Governments 2000, 83).  
Legislative expenditures less the legislative 
compensation total for all members was then divided 
by total number of legislators and then divided by 
average expenditures per member of the U.S. Congress 
less average congressional compensation.  The 
Professional Legislature Index was created by taking 
the staff index and averaging it with the expenditures 
index. 
U.S. Census (2000); 
Congressional 
Quarterly (2000) 
Staff Index Number of staff in 2003 divided by average number of 
U.S.  Congressional staff per legislator in 2003; NCSL 
only has counts for 1996 and 2003 
National Conference  
of State Legislatures 
(2003); 
Congressional 
Quarterly (2000) 
Legislative 
Oversight 
Coded as 1 if respondents identified a legislative audit 
office or budget office as verifying performance 
information.  
Melkers and 
Willoughby Survey 
Dataset 
Legislative Bill Coded as 1 if state had passed a legislative bill 
implementing a performance management reform in 
2000 
Melkers and 
Willoughby (2004) 
Shared 
Responsibility for 
Budgeting 
Coded as a 1 if responsibility for budgeting is shared 
between the executive and legislative branches, 0 if 
process is executive driven. 
U.S. Census, The 
Council of State 
Governments (2000) 
Gubernatorial 
Power 
Used Beyle Index of Governor’s Institutional Power 
for 2000, which includes scale measures (1 to 5) 
capturing governor’s control over the budget, veto 
powers, appointment powers, tenure, and political 
control 
Beyle (2003) 
Executive 
Oversight 
Coded as 1 if respondent identified executive audit 
office or budget office as verifying performance 
information 
Melkers and 
Willoughby Survey, 
Dataset 
Table A6 continues on next page… 
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TABLE A6 (CONTINUED).  INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Measure Methodology Source of Data 
PM Basics Combines two questions that asked respondents to 
determine if their agency had a “significant problem”, 
“somewhat of a problem,” or “no problem” with the 
collection of performance data and maintenance of 
performance data (alpha 0.85).  The variable is coded 
as a three for “significant problem” so one would 
predict a negative association with the dependent 
variables measuring effective managerial use of 
performance measures. 
Melkers and 
Willoughby Survey 
Dataset 
Extent PM Takes a single question asking the extent of “use of 
performance measures” across agencies and divides it 
into a binary variable for those respondents who 
indicated that greater than 50 percent of their agencies 
used performance measures and those who indicated 
that less than 50 percent use performance measures. 
Melkers and 
Willoughby Survey 
Dataset 
Split Legislative 
Control 
Binary variable reflecting different party control of the 
House-Senate chambers 
U.S. Census, The 
Council of State 
Governments (2000) 
Citizen Ideology 
Index 
Used Berry, Ringquist, Fording and Hanson measures 
for 2000. 
Berry et al. (1998) 
Government 
Ideology Index 
Used Berry, Ringquist, Fording and Hanson measures 
for 2000. 
Berry et al. (1998) 
Expenditures, 
Population, and 
Heterogeneity 
Measures 
Taken from U.S. Census 2000 measures; based on 
identification of key measures of heterogeneity in  
(Koetzle 1998). 
U.S. Census (2000) 
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